Egypt: Democracy will empower the Muslim Brotherhood

S E C R E T CAIRO 000181 

SIPDIS 
NOFORN 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/09 
TAGS: PREL MASS PARM ETTC EG
SUBJECT: Scenesetter for Admiral Mullen 

CLASSIFIED BY: Margaret Scobey, Ambassador, DOS, EXO; REASON: 1.4(B), 
(D) 

¶1. (S/NF) Key Points: 



-- Since your last visit, the U.S. and Egypt initiated a 
senior-level Strategic Dialogue that built upon the improved 
bilateral atmosphere following President Obama's June 2009 speech 
in Cairo. We have seen improved cooperation in multilateral fora, 
in addition to close cooperation on regional issues including 
Arab-Israeli peace and Sudan. 



-- While the U.S.-Egypt military relationship remains strong, the 
Egyptian military has been resistant to our efforts to adjust its 
focus to reflect new regional and transnational threats. 



-- While Egyptian leadership continues to view Iran as the greatest 
strategic threat to the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and Sudanese instability are immediate concerns for Egypt. 



-- Egypt has increased counter smuggling efforts, including the 
construction of a subterranean steel wall along the Egypt-Gaza 
border that has provoked intense domestic and regional criticism of 
perceived complicity in the Israeli blockade of Gaza. 



---------------------------- 

Renewed Cooperation 

---------------------------- 



¶2. (C) Admiral Mullen, welcome back to Egypt. Building upon the 
optimism generated by a new U.S. administration and President 
Obama's well-received June 4 speech in Cairo, we resumed in June 
our Strategic Dialogue and set in place a new framework for regular 
bilateral meetings with the Egyptians to explore areas for 
cooperation and coordination, including examining our respective 
assessments of strategic threats such as Iran. The most recent 
meeting was hosted by Under Secretary Burns in December in 
Washington. We are exploring other ways to translate this sense of 
goodwill into concrete action, including a renewed focus in our 
bilateral assistance programs on human capacity development and 
strengthening Egypt's ability to compete in education, science, and 
technology. 



¶3. (S/NF) Our goal remains to widen our military cooperation 
discussion beyond the annual flow of Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF). At the end of 2009, we conducted our two premier bilateral 
military events - the annual Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) 
meeting and the Bright Star military exercise. During the MCC, 
Egypt agreed to implement specific measures to improve their 
ability to protect U.S. technology. During Bright Star, the 
Egyptians canceled several joint-operations that would have 
broadened the exercise's scope. We are working hard to ensure that 
Bright Star 2011 will involve full-spectrum operations. Tantawi 
and his senior leaders recognize and appreciate increased 
engagement with the U.S. military, which provides us an opportunity 
to highlight for them the need to sharpen and focus the Egyptian 
military's mission to reflect new regional threats. Egypt's offer 
to train Iraqi and Afghan military officials provides an 
opportunity for the Egyptian military to play a greater role in 
supporting regional security. Egypt also has plans to significantly 
increase its peace-keeping presence in Africa, including a new 
deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we hope to 
support their efforts through Egypt's inclusion in the Global Peace 
Operations Initiative. We have requested meetings for you with 
President Mubarak, MinDef Field Marshall Tantawi, CoS LTG Anan, and 
EGIS Chief MGen (ret) Soliman. 



--------------------- 

Regional Security 

--------------------- 



¶4. (S/NF) President Mubarak sees Iran as Egypt's -- and the 
region's -- primary strategic threat. Egypt's already dangerous 
neighborhood, he believes, has only become more so since the fall 
of Saddam, who, as nasty as he was, nevertheless stood as a wall 
against Iran. He now sees Tehran's hand moving with ease throughout 
the region, "from the Gulf to Morocco." The immediate threat to 
Egypt comes from Iranian conspiracies with Hamas (which he sees as 
the "brother" of his own most dangerous internal political threat, 
the Muslim Brotherhood) to stir up unrest in Gaza, but he is also 
concerned about Iranian machinations in Sudan and their efforts to 
create havoc elsewhere in the region, including in Yemen, Lebanon, 
and even the Sinai, via Hezbollah. While Tehran's nuclear threat is 
also a cause for concern, Mubarak is more urgently seized with what 
he sees as the rise of Iranian surrogates (Hamas and Hezbollah) and 
Iranian attempts to dominate the Middle East. 



¶5. (S/NF) The Egyptians have stepped up their cooperation with the 
Iraqis considerably, primarily through establishment of a "joint 
committee" which covers the full range of economic, social, 
military and political bilateral development. In November 2009, the 
Egyptians returned an ambassador to Baghdad. MOD is also 
requesting USG approval to sell Iraq 140 M1A1 tanks manufactured in 
Egypt under a co-production agreement. On Afghanistan, the GOE has 
agreed to explore expanding its scope and breadth of programs 
there, including in the areas of education, women's empowerment 
and communications. Egypt has operated a military field hospital 
at Bagram since 2003 with approximately 60 personnel. 



¶6. (S/NF) Egypt's top priority in Africa is the future of Sudan. 
The GOE would like to maintain Sudanese unity because it believes a 
break-up will increase refugee flows into Egypt and threaten 
Egypt's access to Nile waters. However, the GOE is hedging its 
bets by providing South Sudan with development assistance including 
building and staffing medical clinics, helping to clear aquatic 
plants from the White Nile and building power stations and a 
university. Egypt is the fifth-largest peace keeping contributor in 
the world, with the majority of its troops deployed to southern 
Sudan and Darfur. They have also agreed to deploy a large 
contingent to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 



¶7. (S/NF) Egypt continues to support our efforts to resume 
negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians and maintains a 
regular dialogue with all sides. Egyptian sponsored negotiations on 
Palestinian reconciliation are ongoing. Egypt's objectives are to 
avoid another Gaza crisis while eroding Hamas' power and ultimately 
returning the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. 



--------------------------------------------- ----- 

Mil-Mil Cooperation: Counter Smuggling 

--------------------------------------------- ----- 



¶8. (S/NF) President Mubarak and military leaders view our 
military assistance program as a cornerstone of our mil-mil 
relationship and consider the USD 1.3 billion in annual FMF as 
untouchable compensation for making peace with Israel. 
Decision-making within MOD rests almost solely with Defense 
Minister Tantawi. In office since 1991, he consistently resists 
change to the level and direction of FMF funding and is therefore 
one of our chief impediments to transforming our security 
relationship. Nevertheless, he retains President Mubarak's 
support. You should encourage Tantawi to place greater emphasis on 
countering asymmetric threats rather than focusing almost 
exclusively on conventional force. 

¶9. (S/NF) Egypt continues to use a wide range of military, 
security, intelligence, and diplomatic efforts to combat the flow 
of arms to Gaza. The effectiveness of these efforts is difficult to 
assess, and our visibility into these programs is limited. However, 
Egypt has reported success in identifying and intercepting arms 
smuggling networks from Sudan to Cairo, as well as interdicting 
illicit funds destined for Gaza. Israeli officials have also 
reported some satisfaction with increased Egyptian efforts. MOD is 
also participating in a USG-financed project - led by EGIS - to 
install 15 x-ray scanners along the vehicular entrances to the 
Sinai to search for arms and explosives. 



¶10. (S/NF) Tantawi continues to resist U.S. offers of additional 
counter smuggling assistance. Sovereignty concerns are likely 
driving his hesitation, along with concerns that FMF funds may be 
directed away from more high-profile programs like M1A1 tanks and 
aircraft. You should encourage Tantawi to focus more U.S. 
assistance on border security, especially along the remote 
Egypt-Sudan border. You should also remind Tantawi that no single 
technology can stop smuggling. Success will depend on how well 
Egypt uses all available tools and resources to identity and 
disrupt smuggling networks. He will likely reply that BTADS - 
currently on-hold because of security concerns - and the 
subterranean steel wall MOD has begun to install along the 
Egypt-Gaza border, will provide a sufficient counter-smuggling 
capability. 



¶11. (S/NF) Tantawi will likely express concerns over releasability 
issues and frustration with Egypt's inability to procure restricted 
weapons systems. However, concerns over Egypt's end-use 
performance, especially in Congress, continue. You should stress 
that decisions to release advanced weapons systems are made on a 
country-by-country basis, but continued cooperation to improve 
Egypt's protection of American technology and signing a CISMOA 
would be welcome steps in our dialogue on releasability. 



-------------------------------------- 

Internal Politics and Economics 

-------------------------------------- 



¶12. (C) We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, 
including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and 
respect for human rights. While Egypt has made some limited gains 
over the last several years, such as on freedom of the press, 
progress overall has been slow. We continue to press the GOE to 
replace the State of Emergency, in place almost continuously since 
1967, with counterterrorism legislation that protects civil 
liberties. Designed to target violent Islamist extremist groups, 
the GOE has also used the Emergency Law to target political 
activity by the Muslim Brotherhood, bloggers and labor 
demonstrators. The Interior Ministry suppresses political 
opposition through arrests, harassment and intimidation. 



¶13. (C) The GoE remains skeptical of our role in democracy 
promotion, arguing that any efforts to open up will result in 
empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats 
-- as independents -- in Egypt's 454-seat parliament. Elections 
for the upper house of the parliament, or the Shura Council, are to 
be held in June 2010 and elections for the lower house of 
parliament or the People's Assembly are now scheduled for October 
¶2010. Presidential elections will be held in 2011. It is still 
unclear whether President Mubarak, in power for over 25 years, will 
decide to run again. Some believe that he is grooming his son, 
Gamal Mubarak, to succeed him as President. 



¶14. (SBU) Economic reform is ongoing although Egypt still suffers 
from widespread poverty affecting 35-40% of the population. 
Egyptian-U.S. trade more than doubled between 2005 and 2008, before 
slumping in 2009 amidst the global economic crisis. Bilateral trade 
volume was roughly $7.5 billion in 2009, and the U.S. exports to 

Egypt more than twice as much as it imports. Egyptian banks 
operate very conservatively and have been spared involvement in 
risky financial products, but the effects of the global economic 
crisis on Egypt are beginning to be felt. As the global credit 
crunch worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez Canal 
revenues, tourism, and remittances - its largest sources of revenue 
-- are all down and will likely to continue to fall. 
SCOBEY

Source: 10Cairo181

Ricciardone: "We believe Gamal did not complete his compulsory military service"

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 001417 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR WATERS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT 

REF: A. CAIRO 671 
¶B. CAIRO 974 
¶C. 2006 CAIRO 2010 

CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR FRANCIS J. RICCIARDONE, 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 

¶1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION: PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IS 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM OF EGYPTIAN POLITICS. DESPITE 
INCESSANT WHISPERED DISCUSSIONS, NO ONE IN EGYPT HAS ANY 
CERTAINTY ABOUT WHO WILL SUCCEED MUBARAK, OR HOW THE 
SUCCESSION WILL HAPPEN. MUBARAK HIMSELF SEEMS TO BE TRUSTING 
TO GOD AND THE INERTIA OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIAN SECURITY 
SERVICES TO ENSURE AN ORDERLY TRANSITION. IN THE CURRENT 
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, THE MOST LIKELY CONTENDERS ARE 
PRESIDENTIAL SON GAMAL MUBARAK (WHOSE PROFILE IS 
EVER-INCREASING AT THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY), 
EGIS CHIEF OMAR SOLIMAN, DARK HORSE ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY 
GENERAL AMRE MOUSSA, OR AN AS-YET UNKNOWN MILITARY OFFICER. 
WHOEVER ENDS UP AS EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT LIKELY WILL BE 
POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK. ONCE MUBARAK'S SUCCESSOR 
HAS ASSUMED THE POST, HIS FIRST PRIORITY WILL BE TO BUILD 
POPULAR SUPPORT. WE THUS EXPECT THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT WILL 
LIKELY ADOPT AN ANTI-AMERICAN TONE IN HIS INITIAL PUBLIC 
RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO 
THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND MAY POSSIBLY EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH 
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID PREVIOUS EGYPTIAN 
PRESIDENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERMS. END SUMMARY. 

------------------------------ 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR SUCCESSION 
------------------------------ 

¶2. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK IS FOND OF OBSERVING THAT NO ONE 
SHOULD HAVE ANY QUALMS REGARDING HIS SUCCESSION, SINCE 
EGYPT'S CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A DETAILED GUIDE FOR HOW A 
SUCCESSION SHOULD PROCEED. AMONG THE RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS WAS A NOTABLE CHANGE TO THE ARTICLE DETERMINING 
WHICH OFFICIAL ASSUMES POWER IN THE EVENT OF THE TEMPORARY 
INCAPACITATION OF THE PRESIDENT. ARTICLE 82, WHICH 
PREVIOUSLY DELINEATED THAT THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHOULD ASSUME 
PRESIDENTIAL POWERS "IF ON ACCOUNT OF ANY TEMPORARY OBSTACLE 
THE PRESIDENT IS UNABLE TO CARRY OUT HIS DUTIES," HAS BEEN 
AMENDED SO THAT, IF THERE IS NO VICE-PRESIDENT, THE PRIME 
MINISTER IS ASSIGNED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. ARTICLE 84 READS, 
"IN CASE OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE OR THE 
PERMANENT DISABILITY OF THE PRESIDENT," THE PRESIDENT OF THE 
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY (PA) OR THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SHOULD TEMPORARILY ASSUME THE 
PRESIDENCY. NEITHER WOULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE ALLOWED TO 
NOMINATE HIMSELF FOR THE PRESIDENCY; THERE IS NO SUCH 
STIPULATION AGAINST THE PM RUNNING FOR THE OFFICE. ARTICLE 
84 GOES ON TO STIPULATE THAT, "THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
SHALL BE CHOSEN WITHIN A MAXIMUM PERIOD OF 60 DAYS FROM THE 
DAY OF THE VACANCY OF THE PRESIDENCY." 

¶3. (C) CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 76, WHICH PREVIOUSLY WIRED THE 
EGYPTIAN ELECTORAL FRAMEWORK TO GUARANTEE THE PRESIDENCY TO 
THE RULING NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NDP), WAS ALSO AMONG 
THE ARTICLES AMENDED IN APRIL (REF A). THE CHANGE WILL 
OSTENSIBLY FACILITATE MORE COMPETITIVE PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, WHILE STILL PROTECTING AGAINST ANY SERIOUS 
CHALLENGE TO THE NDP CANDIDATE. UNDER THE REVISIONS TO 
ARTICLE 76, FOR AN INTERIM 10-YEAR PERIOD (I.E. UNTIL 2017), 
LEGAL POLITICAL PARTIES WHICH HOLD AN ELECTED SEAT IN THE 
PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OR SHURA COUNCIL CAN NOMINATE A 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE (CURRENTLY, ONLY FOUR PARTIES MEET 
THIS REQUIREMENT - THE NDP, AL GHAD, AL WAFD, AND TAGGAMU). 
FOLLOWING THE INTERIM PERIOD, IN ORDER TO RUN A PRESIDENTIAL 
CANDIDATE: 

-- A PARTY HAS TO HAVE BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR AT LEAST 5 YEARS 
PRIOR TO THE ELECTION; 

-- ITS CANDIDATE MUST HAVE BEEN A MEMBER OF THE HIGHEST 
LEADERSHIP BODY OF THE PARTY FOR AT LEAST 1 YEAR; AND, 

-- THE PARTY WOULD HAVE TO HOLD AT LEAST 3% OF THE SEATS IN 
BOTH PARLIAMENTARY HOUSES (I.E., 14 SEATS IN THE PEOPLE'S 
ASSEMBLY, AND 6 SEATS IN THE SHURA COUNCIL), OR 6% OF THE 
SEATS 
IN EITHER THE PA OR SHURA COUNCIL). 

¶4. (C) GENUINELY INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES FACE AN ALMOST 
IMPOSSIBLE BAR TO ENTER THE RACE. TO COMPETE IN THE NEXT 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ARTICLE 76 STATES THAT AN 
"INDEPENDENT" MUST OBTAIN ENDORSEMENTS FROM 250 ELECTED 
MEMBERS OF EGYPT'S NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES, 
OF WHICH THERE MUST BE A MINIMUM OF 65 ENDORSEMENTS FROM 
MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLES ASSEMBLY, 25 FROM THE SHURA COUNCIL, 
AND 10 FROM LOCAL COUNCILS IN AT LEAST 14 GOVERNORATES. THIS 
WOULD BE A NEAR UNATTAINABLE FEAT FOR A NON-NDP CANDIDATE TO 
ACHIEVE, GIVEN THE RULING PARTY'S DOMINATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN 
ELECTED BODIES. IN EFFECT, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 76 
ACCOMPLISH TWO OBJECTIVES REGARDING INDEPENDENTS: THE RULING 
PARTY CAN BLOCK THE EMERGENCE OF ANY GENUINELY "INDEPENDENT" 
CANDIDATE, WHILE IT COULD THEORETICALLY REACH BEYOND THE 
NDP'S TOP LEADERSHIP TO SELECT AN "INDEPENDENT" WHOM THE 
RULING ELITE JUDGES WILL BEST PROTECT THEIR INTERESTS, 
PROVIDED THE NDP RETAINS PARTY DISCIPLINE. 

-------------------- 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES 
-------------------- 

¶5. (C) PRESIDENT MUBARAK, WHO BEGAN HIS FIFTH 6-YEAR TERM IN 
SEPTEMBER 2005, RECENTLY TURNED 79. THE NEXT PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION IS DUE TO BE HELD IN 2011. BY THE TIME MUBARAK 
SERVES HIS FULL TERM, THERE MAY BE OTHER CANDIDATES IN THE 
WINGS, OR MUBARAK HIMSELF COULD CHOOSE TO RUN AGAIN FOR THE 
PRESIDENCY. HE IS ON RECORD AS SAYING, IN A NOVEMBER 2006 
SPEECH, THAT HE PLANNED TO REMAIN PRESIDENT "AS LONG AS I 
HAVE A HEART THAT BEATS, AND BREATH IN MY BODY." BUT IF THE 
SUCCESSION HAPPENED TOMORROW, EGYPTIAN PARLOR SPECULATION 
FOCUSES ON THE FOLLOWING AS POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS. 

GAMAL MUBARAK 
------------- 

¶6. (C) CAIRENE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HOLDS THAT GAMAL WANTS THE 
JOB, DESPITE HIS REPEATED DENIALS TO THE CONTRARY (REF B). 
THE MOST RECENT SUCH ABJURATION WAS ON MAY 2, DURING AN 
INTERVIEW WITH THE ORBIT SATELLITE TV CHANNEL, WHEN GAMAL 
STATED THAT, "I DO NOT HAVE THE INTENTION AND AMBITION TO RUN 
FOR PRESIDENT ... WHATEVER THE PARTY SAYS DOES NOT MATTER. I 
AM NOT LOOKING FOR ANY EXECUTIVE POST." SUCH COY DEMURRALS 
RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF HIS INCREASINGLY ROBUST ROLE 
WITHIN THE NDP (FAR EXCEEDING THAT OF HIS COUNTERPARTS IN THE 
PARTY HIERARCHY), HIS APPARENTLY CENTRAL ROLE IN CREATING NEW 
LEGISLATION, AND HIS RECENT TOURS TO VARIOUS GOVERNORATES 
FEATURING MINISTERIAL ENTOURAGES. IT IS HARD TO ARGUE THAT 
GAMAL IS NOT BEING GROOMED FOR THE PRESIDENCY. 

¶7. (C) MANY IN THE EGYPTIAN ELITE SEE HIS SUCCESSION AS 
POSITIVE, AS HIS LIKELY CONTINUATION OF THE CURRENT STATUS 
QUO WOULD SERVE THEIR BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS. 
GIVEN THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CANDIDACY, AND WEAK 
OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP, THERE ARE CURRENTLY FEW OTHER EGYPTIAN 
PERSONALITIES WITH THE NATIONAL STATURE AND POLITICAL CAPITAL 
TO SERIOUSLY CONTEND FOR THE PRESIDENCY. LIKEWISE, DUE TO 
THE PARANOIA OF THE EGYPTIAN DICTATORSHIP, NO OTHER NAME CAN 
SAFELY OR RESPECTFULLY BE BRUITED AS A CONTENDER. WHILE THE 
PRESIDENT'S SON IS VULNERABLE TO OPEN CRITICISM FOR HIS 
PRESUMED AMBITION, HE IS THE ONLY PERSON IN EGYPT WHOSE TOTAL 
LOYALTY TO MUBARAK IS ALSO TAKEN FOR GRANTED, SO HIS IS THE 
ONLY NAME THAT CAN POSSIBLY BE BANDIED ABOUT. 

¶8. (C) A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK FOR A GAMAL CANDIDACY COULD BE 
THE MILITARY. EACH OF EGYPT'S FOUR PRESIDENTS SINCE 1952 
AROSE FROM THE OFFICER CORPS, AND THE MILITARY HAS 
HISTORICALLY BEEN THE ULTIMATE GUARANTOR OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
RULE. GAMAL DID NOT SERVE AS A MILITARY OFFICER, AND WE 
BELIEVE HE DID NOT COMPLETE HIS COMPULSORY SERVICE. MANY 
OBSERVERS OPINE THAT TIMING IS THE CRUCIAL FACTOR FOR A 
POTENTIAL GAMAL PRESIDENCY - HIS POWER BASE IS HIS FATHER, 
AND SO WHILE HE COULD CONCEIVABLY BE INSTALLED PRIOR TO 
MUBARAK'S DEATH, THE TASK WOULD BECOME FAR MORE DIFFICULT, 
ALTHOUGH NOT INSURMOUNTABLE, ONCE THE PHARAOH HAS DEPARTED 
THE SCENE, AND PERSONAL LOYALTIES TO HIM ARE IN THE PAST. 
ALTHOUGH THERE IS WIDESPREAD POPULAR ANIMUS AGAINST A GAMAL 
CANDIDACY, WITH MANY EGYPTIANS OPINING PROUDLY THAT, "WE ARE 
NOT SYRIA OR SAUDI!", THE NDP MACHINERY COULD LIKELY STAGE AN 
ELECTORAL VICTORY, BASED ON POOR VOTER TURNOUT, SLOPPY VOTER 
LISTS, AND STATE CONTROL OF THE ELECTION APPARATUS. 

OMAR SOLIMAN 
------------- 

¶9. (C) EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE CHIEF AND MUBARAK CONSIGLIERE, 
IN PAST YEARS SOLIMAN WAS OFTEN CITED AS LIKELY TO BE NAMED 
TO THE LONG-VACANT VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POST. IN THE PAST TWO 
YEARS, SOLIMAN HAS STEPPED OUT OF THE SHADOWS, AND ALLOWED 
HIMSELF TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED, AND HIS MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN 
LEADERS REPORTED. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT SOLIMAN, 
BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY BACKGROUND, WOULD AT THE LEAST HAVE 
TO FIGURE IN ANY SUCCESSION SCENARIO FOR GAMAL, POSSIBLY AS A 
TRANSITIONAL FIGURE. SOLIMAN HIMSELF ADAMANTLY DENIES ANY 
PERSONAL AMBITIONS, BUT HIS INTEREST AND DEDICATION TO 
NATIONAL SERVICE IS OBVIOUS. HIS LOYALTY TO MUBARAK SEEMS 
ROCK-SOLID. AT AGE 71, HE COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO THE RULING 
APPARATUS AND THE PUBLIC AT LARGE AS A RELIABLE FIGURE 
UNLIKELY TO HARBOR AMBITIONS FOR ANOTHER MULTI-DECADE 
PRESIDENCY. A KEY UNANSWERED QUESTION IS HOW HE WOULD 
RESPOND TO A GAMAL PRESIDENCY ONCE MUBARAK IS DEAD. AN 
ALLEGED PERSONAL FRIEND OF SOLIMAN TELLS US THAT SOLIMAN 
"DETESTS" THE IDEA OF GAMAL AS PRESIDENT, AND THAT HE ALSO 
WAS "DEEPLY PERSONALLY HURT" BY MUBARAK, WHO PROMISED TO NAME 
HIM VICE-PRESIDENT SEVERAL YEARS AGO, BUT THEN RENEGED. 

AMRE MOUSSA 
----------- 

¶10. (C) THE CHARISMATIC ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL 
PRUDENTLY HAS NEVER INDICATED INTENTION OR AMBITION TO ENTER 
INTO EGYPTS DOMESTIC POLITICAL FRAY, AND HAS NO EGYPTIAN 
INSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL PLATFORM FROM WHICH TO SPRING. 
HOWEVER, AS THE HIGH-PROFILE ELDER STATESMAN OF ARAB CAUSES, 
HE ENJOYS CONSIDERABLE STREET CREDIBILITY, POPULARITY, AND 
PERCEIVED GRAVITAS. IT IS FAR-FETCHED BUT CONCEIVABLE THAT, 
IN A LEADERSHIP CRISIS FOLLOWING MUBARAK'S DEATH, MOUSSA 
COULD EMERGE AS A PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDER, PROVIDED THAT HE IS 
AN NDP MEMBER, OR IF THE NDP WERE TO PROMOTE HIM UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ALLOWED FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES. 

MILITARY OFFICER 
---------------- 

¶11. (C) CURRENTLY, THERE IS NO OBVIOUS CONTENDER FROM AMONG 
THE OFFICER CORPS, EGYPT'S TRADITIONAL PRESIDENTIAL 
RECRUITMENT GROUNDS. MINISTER OF DEFENSE TANTAWI, A 
CONTEMPORARY OF MUBARAK'S, APPEARS TO HARBOR NO POLITICAL 
AMBITIONS. LIKE SOLIMAN, HE COULD PLAY A ROLE IN CLEARING 
THE WAY FOR GAMAL, IF HE CALCULATES THAT IS IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY; CONVERSELY, HE COULD ALSO BE A KEY 
PLAYER IN PREVENTING GAMALS ASCENDANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SOME 
LIMITED REPORTS OF TANTAWIS INCREASING FRUSTRATION AND 
DISENCHANTMENT WITH GAMAL (REF B). IN THE EVENT OF A NATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP CRISIS, IT IS NEAR INCONCEIVABLE THAT GIVEN 
MUBARAK'S PERSONAL MANIPULATION OF THE OFFICE CORPS, THAT 
ANOTHER MILITARY OFFICER COULD EMERGE FROM OBSCURITY TO 
ASSERT HIMSELF AS A CANDIDATE. BUT TANTAWI AND HIS SENIOR 
COTERIE ARE NOT NECESSARILY POPULAR AT MID AND LOWER RANKS, 
SO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MID-20TH CENTURY STYLE COUP OF 
COLONELS CANNOT BE ENTIRELY DISCOUNTED. 

OPPOSITION MEMBER 
----------------- 

¶12. (C) OF THE 10 PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS IN 2005, 
SECOND-PLACE AL GHAD PARTY LEADER AYMAN NOUR IS CURRENTLY 
SERVING A SEVEN-YEAR JAIL TERM, AND ACCORDING TO EGYPTIAN 
LAW, WILL BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL 
LIFE FOR SEVERAL YEARS FOLLOWING HIS RELEASE. THE 
THIRD-PLACE FINISHER, AL WAFD PARTY CANDIDATE NO'MAN GOMAA, 
LOST HIS PARTY POSITION FOLLOWING A VIOLENT AND 
SCANDAL-RIDDEN LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE. THE OTHER EIGHT 
CANDIDATES, MARGINAL FIGURES TO BEGIN WITH, HAVE FADED BACK 
INTO TOTAL OBSCURITY. CURRENT AL WAFD LEADER MAHMOUD ABAZA 
IS A TALENTED POLITICIAN, BUT AT THIS POINT, DOES NOT APPEAR 
TO HAVE NATIONAL APPEAL OR ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY TO MOUNT A 
SERIOUS ATTEMPT AT THE PRESIDENCY. 

DARK HORSE AND ALSO RANS 
------------------------ 

¶13. (C) POPULAR REFORMIST MINISTER OF TRADE RACHID IS A 
POTENTIAL CANDIDATE, THOUGH A DISTINCT DARK HORSE. 
NONETHELESS, HE COMES FROM AN OLD AND RESPECTED FAMILY AND IS 
SEEN BY MANY AS LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR EGYPT'S IMPRESSIVE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE PAST THREE YEARS. INTERESTINGLY, THE 
HEAD OF CAIRO'S LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMCHAM, WHO KNOWS 
RACHID WELL, TOLD US THAT, AFTER NEGOTIATING THE 
CONTROVERSIAL QIZ PROGRAM, THE MINISTER "REALLY NEEDS 
MOVEMENT ON THE FTA FOR POLITICAL COVER," RAISING THE 
QUESTION: POLITICAL COVER FOR WHAT? WHILE IT IS HIGHLY 
UNLIKELY RACHID WOULD TAKE ON GAMAL HEAD-TO-HEAD, WE CANNOT 
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WILLPLAY A ROLE IN A 
CARETAKER GOVERNMENT, AND MAY EENTUALLY EMERGE AS A LEADER. 


¶14. (C) SAFWAT ELSHERIF (NDP SECRETARY GENERAL AND SHURA 
COUNCIL PEAKER), MUFEED SHEHAB (NDP ASSISTANT SYG, AND 
MINISTER OF STATE FOR LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS, AND 
ZAKARIA AZMY (NDP ASSISTANT SYG AND MUBARA'S DE FACTO CHIEF 
OF STAFF) ALL, AS SENIOR LEADES OF THE NDP, MEET THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRITERIA T RUN FOR OFFICE. NONE OF THESE 
GRIZZLED NDP VETERANS HAVE PUBLICLY EXPRESSED PRESIDENTIAL 
ASPIRATONS, NOR DO THEY APPEAR TO POSSESS ANY CAPABILITIE 
TO GOVERN, NOR PERSONAL CONSTITUENCIES. HOWEVE, WHILE 
UNLIKELY, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT, ONCE MUBAAK PERE IS OUT OF 
THE PICTURE, ONE OF THEM COULD EMERGE IN AN ANTI-GAMAL PARTY 
PUTSCH. FURTHERMORE. MOST ANALYSTS HERE BELIEVE THAT ANY 
GOVERNOR PUSHING FOR THE PRESIDENCY IS A FAR-FETCHED 
POSSIBILITY - THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF GOVERNORS ARE 
FORMER SENIOR MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICERS CHOSEN FOR THEIR 
LOYALTY, FAR FROM THE CRITICAL POLITICAL FRAY IN CAIRO, AND 
WITH NO POWER BASES. 

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD 
------------------ 

¶15. (C) WHILE THE SPECTER OF AN MB PRESIDENCY HAUNTS SECULAR 
EGYPTIANS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY IN THE IMMEDIATE 
POST-MUBARAK PERIOD. UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE 
MB HAS NO ABILITY TO PUT FORWARD A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE IN 
THE EVENT OF AN ELECTION. THE ORGANIZATION DOES NOT APPEAR 
TO HAVE THE ORGANIZED MILITARY WING NECESSARY SHOULD IT WISH 
TO ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE PRESIDENCY BY FORCE. CONSTANT 
OVERSIGHT OF THE ARMED FORCES AIMED AT ROOTING OUT POTENTIAL 
ISLAMIST SYMPATHIZERS MEANS THAT FEW LIKELY REMAIN, ALTHOUGH 
THE POSSIBILITY DOES EXIST THAT SOME CLOSE-MOUTHED MB-LEANING 
OFFICERS ARE PRESENT. OVERALL, IN THE VIEW OF MOST EGYPTIAN 
ANALYSTS, THE GROUP'S APPROACH SEEMS TO BE ONE OF PATIENCE 
AND GRASS ROOTS BUILDING OF SUPPORT, WAITING FOR THE DAY WHEN 
IT MIGHT COME TO POWER THROUGH POPULAR ELECTION, OR BY 
POPULAR DEMAND AFTER A GAMAL PRESIDENCY HAS FOUNDERED. 

------------------------ 
POST-SUCCESSION DYNAMICS 
------------------------ 

¶16. (C) WHOEVER EGYPT'S NEXT PRESIDENT IS, HE WILL INEVITABLY 
BE POLITICALLY WEAKER THAN MUBARAK, AND ONCE HE HAS ASSUMED 
THE POST, AMONG HIS FIRST PRIORITIES WILL BE TO CEMENT HIS 
POSITION AND BUILD POPULAR SUPPORT. WE CAN THUS ANTICIPATE 
THAT THE NEW PRESIDENT MAY SOUND AN INITIAL ANTI-AMERICAN 
TONE IN HIS PUBLIC RHETORIC, IN AN EFFORT TO PROVE HIS 
NATIONALIST BONA FIDES TO THE EGYPTIAN STREET, AND DISTANCE 
HIMSELF FROM MUBARAK'S POLICIES. IF HISTORY IS ANY GUIDE, WE 
CAN ALSO EXPECT THE NEW PRESIDENT TO EXTEND AN OLIVE BRANCH 
TO THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD, AS DID GAMAL ABDEL NASSER, ANWAR 
EL SADAT, AND MUBARAK EARLY IN ALL OF THEIR TERMS, IN AN 
EFFORT TO CO-OPT POTENTIAL OPPOSITION, AND BOOST POPULARITY. 
RICCIARDONE

Source: 07Cairo1417

الترجمة العربية: بقلم سارة حسين

Sadat and Mubarak, any similarities?

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002871 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

STATE FOR NEA/ELA; NSC FOR RWATERS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT IN TRANSITION: SADAT AND MUBARAK 

REF: A. CAIRO 2839 
¶B. CAIRO 2825 

Classified By: ECPO Minister Counselor William R. Stewart 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

¶1. (C) Egypt faces uncertainty as it moves towards a 
post-Mubarak future. It has been almost exactly twenty-six 
years since Egypt last faced such a transition. Although one 
could argue that some of the elements that led to the 
dramatic events of September and October 1981 are back in 
place -- shortages of basic foodstuffs, external political 
pressures, and crackdowns on political adversaries -- 
tensions now are different, and not on the same scale. While 
we should not place too much weight in analogy, it can 
nevertheless be instructive to review the events of September 
and October 1981 to see what useful comparisons can be made. 
End summary. 

--------------- 
Rumors Run Amok 
--------------- 

¶2. (C) This September, as in past late summers, salon talk 
and front page headlines have focused on that most sensitive 
of topics: the health of the president and the eventual 
transfer of power. Talk has been so pervasive, Prime 
Minister Nazif felt obliged to announce that "there is a 
system for the smooth transfer of power." Rumors of 
President Mubarak's deteriorating health -- and even his 
demise -- have been so insistent, even Suzanne Mubarak felt 
the need to publicly assert that he is alive and well. 

¶3. (C) At least half a dozen editorials have compared the 
tensions and rumors of this September to September 1981. 
Although the majority of Egyptians are too young to recall 
personally those momentous times, the lore of it remains deep 
in the national consciousness. Even young Egyptians recall 
hearing of the great "round up" of September 3, 1981 when 
Sadat seemed to "go crazy" as one commentator recalled, 
arresting and imprisoning opponents and critics of every 
stripe. Communists, Nasserists, Muslim Brothers, academics, 
and liberal-minded journalists found themselves cell-mates 
that late summer day. Even Coptic Pope Shenouda was placed 
under house arrest. Although Mubarak has hardly gone so far, 
some observers have argued that his feuds with Ayman Nour, 
Anwar Esmat El-Sadat (the late president's nephew), Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim, independent editors, and other perceived 
opponents, combined with his sweeping roundup of the Muslim 
Brotherhood -- arguably his only real political threat -- is 
reminiscent of 1981, and they fear it could lead to similar 
consequences. 

------------------- 
Mubarak Is No Sadat 
------------------- 

¶4. (C) According to some of Egypt's most astute political 
observers, this is over-analyzing the situation and drawing 
very wrong -- and dangerous - comparisons. Mohammed 
El-Bassiouni, chairman of the Majlis al-Shura's National 
Security Committee (which also has responsibility for Foreign 
Affairs and Arab Affairs), believes that the two Septembers 
have very little in common. El-Bassiouni recently told 
MinCouns that in 1981, when he was Egypt's military attach 
in Tel Aviv, President Sadat was under extreme pressure for 
not providing the "peace dividend" he had promised would be 
the result of his bold move towards Israel, and his deepening 
friendship the United States. When prosperity for all did 
not appear, Sadat felt under enormous pressure. Combined 
with Egypt's isolation in the Arab world, it seemed that his 
gamble had failed. In his pride, he lashed out at perceived 
opponents. 

-------------- 
No Comparison? 
-------------- 

¶5. (C) Such a scenario simply does not exist today, 
El-Bassiouni opined. Egypt's economy is growing, the fruit 
of President Mubarak's reform program launched in 2004. 
While relations with Israel are still "problematic," Mubarak 
has taken Egypt back to its rightful position as leader of 
the Arab world. The external pressures that helped stoke the 
tension of September 1981 "simply do not exist today." 

¶6. (C) Another alleged similarity between the present and 
Sadat's September is the shortage of basic commodities. 
Egyptians have been angered in recent weeks by reports of 
villages without access to drinking water -- in some cases, 
for years (ref A). Shortages of subsidized bread have also 
been in the headlines, as the poorest Egyptians wait in 
queues for shrinking loaves. At least one observer has made 
the case that September 2007 is more reminiscent of January 
1977 -- when riots erupted throughout Egypt due to price 
increases for bread and other basic foodstuffs -- than 
September 1981. But Dr. Galal Amin, economics professor at 
AUC (as he was in 1981) thinks there is little in common, 
economically, between the two eras. Egypt under Sadat, he 
argued, was actually better off in many ways: unemployment, 
which he sees as the single greatest problem facing Mubarak 
today, was lower then, and the overall standard of living was 
higher. The average Egyptian, he said felt that 
opportunities were greater in 1981, leading to general 
optimism. Sadat's "infitah" program, opening up Egypt's 
economy to foreign investment appeared to be working and 
creating jobs. Tourism was taking off, and the average 
Egyptian "felt good" about his life and better about his 
future than Egyptians today, according to Amin. Economic 
statistics refute Amin's assertions, but there is a 
perception within a certain statist/elite/academic 
demographic, represented by Amin, that somehow Sadat's were 
"the good old days." 

------------------------------------------- 
Economic Reform Still Masks Underlying Woes 
------------------------------------------- 

¶7. (C) Sadat trumpeted economic reform, touting 
privatization, pointing to a freer market that would benefit 
all Egyptians. These thoughts have been echoed under 
Mubarak, especially since the appointment of Prime Minister 
Nazif and his cabinet of economic reformers in 2004. 
However, as in 1981, recent economic advances are incomplete. 
Gigantic government subsidies then, as now, have served to 
brake greater economic reform. In 1981, 21.5% of the Gross 
National Income (GNI) went to the wealthiest 5% of the 
population, while the poorest 20% of the population received 
a mere 5% of Egypt's income. In 2007, there remains the 
general sense that Egypt's economic growth is benefiting only 
a tiny portion of the population. 17% of today's population 
lives under the poverty line, almost identical to the 
percentage in 1981, and the poorest 20% of the population 
received 4.8% of the GNI in 2004/05, while the richest 10% of 
the population received 30% of GNI. Although statistically 
the standard of living has not dramatically deteriorated, 
neither has it improved, leaving Egyptians with the feeling 
that others have passed them by to a brighter economic 
future. 

-------------- 
The Odd Couple 
-------------- 

¶8. (C) What the two periods unquestionably do have in common 
are a pair of increasingly isolated dictators, set in their 
ways and fearful of any kind of dissent. But though alike in 
certain personal characteristics (particularly paranoia), 
there are at the same time some very fundamental differences, 
including age (Sadat was a robust 63 years old when 
assassinated; Mubarak is a slowing 79) and length in office 
(barely 11 years for Sadat, closing on 26 years for Mubarak). 
Importantly, Sadat had a clear successor -- his vice 
president, Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak, in turn, has scrupulously 
avoided naming a VP, and although most believe that son Gamal 
will succeed him, no one can say for certain how that will 
play out. Another dissimilarity: Minister of Information 
Enas El-Fiqi, under intense scrutiny and pressure himself for 
allowing the rumors about Mubarak's health to get out of 
control, recently told the Ambassador that "there is no 
comparison" between Sadat and Mubarak because, "Mubarak never 
loses his temper." (El-Fiqi, though, admitted that the 
stress of his job was literally driving him to drink.) 

¶9. (C) Mubarak relishes his self-image as a benign, paternal 
leader, tough but fair. Still, he has shown signs of moving 
toward Sadat's modus operandi in dealing with political 
opponents. In the past year, Mubarak has arrested upwards of 
a thousand Muslim Brothers. While some have subsequently 
been released and only 40 are facing trial before a military 
tribunal so far, the message is unmistakable: after allowing 
the MB to participate in the 2005 parliamentary elections as 
"independents" (in which they won 88 seats, 20% of the 
Assembly), Mubarak is cracking down. Another similarity is 
the recent phobia Mubarak has developed towards the press. 
The Egyptian media, arguably as free as it has ever been (and 
certainly freer than it was under Sadat), is suddenly facing 
a cost for that liberty. In early September, four editors of 
independent newspapers were convicted of insulting the 
president and other GoE officials, while another editor is 
facing trial October 1 for allegedly spreading false rumors 
about Mubarak's health which were damaging to Egypt's 
reputation and to its economy. These arrests have been 
widely seen here as blatant attacks on the freedom of the 
press, much as Sadat's rounding up of journalists was in 
¶1981. 

------------------------- 
Love and Hate For the USA 
------------------------- 

¶10. (C) One of the more striking similarities between the two 
leaders is their uneven relationship with the United States. 
Sadat's September madness came close on the heels of a 
profoundly disappointing trip to the United States to meet 
the new President, Ronald Reagan. By discarding the Soviet 
Union and reaching out to the United States -- and Israel -- 
he had taken considerable political risk. He had calculated 
that the payoff in tangible and intangible terms would more 
than justify that risk. But as his international stature 
increased spectacularly as the Arab world's "Man of Peace," 
his standing at home did not keep pace, as heightened 
expectations for peace and prosperity were unrealized. 
Still, in the U.S. he felt he had found a faithful ally, one 
that would stand by him even when his own people did not. 
Unfortunately, President Reagan's reception of Sadat in 
August 1981 was lukewarm, and Sadat came under severe 
criticism by the U.S. press for not delivering true peace to 
the Middle East. According to Mohamed Heikal, Sadat's former 
Minister of Information (who was himself arrested on 
September 3, 1981), Sadat returned to Egypt a bitter man, 
feeling betrayed by the Americans. Shortly afterwards came 
the arrests. 

-------------- 
Twin Twilights 
-------------- 

¶11. (C) At the end of the day, and the end of their reigns, 
Sadat faced and Mubarak faces similar situations. But 
Mubarak seems to have managed the dilemma better in at least 
one key area: he has systematically and "legally" eliminated 
virtually all political opposition, leaving only the MB 
standing, having foresworn violence and politically 
emasculated. Mubarak's internal security apparatus, an 
estimated 1.4 million strong, is at least twice the size it 
was under Sadat. Its ubiquitous presence and monopoly of the 
legitimate use of armed power makes any kind of violent 
change of leader unlikely. 

--------------------- 
The One Certain Thing 
--------------------- 

¶12. (C) The two presidents share another undeniable point in 
common: their mortality. Mubarak's street credibility, like 
Sadat's, is very low. The was illustrated by the insistent 
rumors of Mubarak's illness and death, despite numerous 
official denials. This lack of faith by the people of Egypt 
in their political leaders could well come back to haunt 
Mubarak's successor, whomever he may be. Will it make the 
transition more difficult? Yes. Will it matter in the end? 
Probably not, as long as the successor enjoys the support of 
the elite and the security apparatus, including the military. 
And even if there is a valid analogy to draw between 
September 1981 and September 2007, it is at best uneven. The 
world -- and Egypt -- have fundamentally changed. While 
President Mubarak clearly faces significant challenges, and 
has reacted with at least some measure of Sadat's paranoia, 
we do not foresee September 2007 leading to another October 
¶1981. 
JONES

Source: 07Cairo2871

الترجمة العربية: بقلم حازم فؤاد

Gamal Mubarak views in regards to the presidential and parliamentary elections

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 007782 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: PDAS LIZ CHENEY'S SEPTEMBER 28 MEETING WITH GAMAL 
MUBARAK 

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

¶1. (C) In a September 28 meeting with PDAS Elizabeth 
Cheney, Gamal Mubarak, head of the NDP Policies Committee, 
reviewed his father's presidential election campaign, which 
he argued had been a major success. He also reviewed the 
ruling party's preparations for the upcoming parliamentary 
elections. PDAS Cheney reminded Gamal of the paramount 
importance that the USG places on international monitoring 
and urged him to use his influence to encourage the GOE/NDP 
to undertake other concrete improvements in the electoral 
process. Significant improvements in the parliamentary 
elections, the PDAS noted, would be crucial to continuing 
Egypt's democratic reform progress. End summary. 

--------------------------------------------- ---- 
The NDP's Campaign Architect Reviews His Creation 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 

¶2. (C) PDAS Cheney, joined by DAS Carpenter, Charge, and 
poloff (notetaker) met with Gamal Mubarak on September 28 to 
discuss Egypt's political reform progress. Gamal opened the 
meeting with questions about Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
PDAS Cheney updated Gamal on cleanup and recovery efforts and 
thanked him for GOE relief supplies. The Charge noted that 
Washington had been gratified by the speed of the GOE airlift 
to supply water, blankets, and other items. 

¶3. (C) Turning to the September 7 presidential election, 
Gamal noted that he and his NDP colleagues had been working 
on the campaign since the end of June, when President Mubarak 
had indicated that "he wanted a proper campaign team." Gamal 
said the team, which included Ahmad Ezz and Mohammad Kamal, 
used focus groups and polling to fine tune the President's 
message. After the campaign team devised a "credible 
program," which the NDP "simplified" to address focus group 
concerns, the party used the campaign period (August 
17-September 3) to reach out to voters. 

¶4. (C) Gamal noted that his father had directed the party 
to "run a positive campaign," and to respond only to attacks 
that misrepresented policy. Gamal attributed the NDP's 
success to a packed schedule of campaign events (nearly one 
major event per day) along with DVC outreach to provincial 
party leaders, and personal letters from the President to 
each of the party's 7000 "basic unit leaders" (i.e., precinct 
bosses). According to Gamal, the precinct bosses were 
"absolutely crucial" and the "backbone" of an effort to "fire 
up" youthful NDP voters. In response to a question by the 
PDAS, Gamal said that his father had much enjoyed the 
"intensity" of the campaign as well as his engagement with 
party activists. Gamal said that the final event of the 
campaign, the closing rally at Abdeen Palace in Cairo, had 
been a "big success," since it linked the President to key 
episodes in Egyptian historical memory. 

¶5. (C) The PDAS noted the USG's continuing encouragement of 
the GOE to invite international observers, and pressed Gamal 
to identify areas that he though could be improved in future 
elections. Gamal described Egypt's outdated and incoherent 
voter lists as "not a huge issue," but noted that cleaning 
them up would be a long-term project. He blamed the low 
turnout of the presidential election (about 7 million voters 
or 23 percent) on overzealous judges supervising the 
September 7 ballot who had, allegedly, refused to allow more 
than one voter at a time into polling stations, and thereby 
diminished turnout. "We were aiming for at least nine 
million voters, but many people went home without voting 
because of the queues," Gamal said. 

¶6. (C) Gamal termed the controversy over domestic observers 
on election day as "a huge mess," and noted that the party 
had tried to play a constructive role on this issue, behind 
the scenes, despite the obstructionism of the Presidential 
Election Commission and some of the judges. The PDAS 
reiterated the USG's views on international monitors and 
urged him to use his influence in support of both 
international and domestic monitors. 

------------------------------------- 
Plans for the Parliamentary Elections 
------------------------------------- 

¶7. (C) Turning to the parliamentary elections, which will 
be held in three stages beginning on November 8, Gamal said 
that a central difference with the presidential campaign 
would be that campaigning for the 444 parliamentary races 
"would be the party's effort, not the President's." The 
President plans to campaign on behalf of some candidates, 
however and the Party plans to use the same Heliopolis 
campaign headquarters and core team, although this team will 
be "adjusted for the battle." 

¶8. (C) The PDAS asked how the party plans to select its 
candidates. Gamal noted that the party's selection process 
hadn't worked in the past, since it permitted candidates with 
deep pockets to win the party endorsement even if they were 
not able to win at the polls. (Note: In the 2000 elections, 
official NDP candidates won less than 40 percent of the 
seats. Most winners were so-called "NDP independents" who 
had not managed to secure the party's endorsement but 
nevertheless prevailed at the poll and eventually rejoined 
the party, thereby giving the NDP its lock on Parliament. 
End note.) 

¶9. (C) Gamal provided an overview of the new process. He 
said that the party would hold "primaries" during the first 
week of October, which would assemble precinct bosses and 
other grass roots leaders to bet potential candidates. Gamal 
said that in addition to this popularity contest, the party 
would use polling, analysis of the voting in the presidential 
election, and a "software" analysis to create a single 
consolidated party slate of candidates. 

------------------------------------------- 
But How Will They Be Better than Last Time? 
------------------------------------------- 

¶10. (C) Gamal said that the parliamentary elections would 
be "both messier and easier" than the presidential election. 
The PDAS pressed Gamal to suggest steps that the GOE could 
take in the next few weeks to demonstrate its commitment to 
political reform. In response to the PDAS's inquiry about 
the GOE utilizing transparent ballot boxes in place of the 
existing wooden boxes, Gamal described them as "cosmetic." 
For Egypt, he said, the key is judicial supervision. Gamal 
also dismissed alleged problems with indelible ink, multiple 
voting, and voting by unregistered citizens. All of these 
allegations, he said, were "unfounded." 

¶11. (C) More important, he argued had been the information 
deficit. Voters had sometimes not known which polling 
stations to report to, and the lists of registered voters had 
not been widely available ahead of time. Improving the 
available information about the polling station locations and 
access was Gamal's highest priority. "If I was in charge," 
he said, "this is what I'd do." 

¶12. (C) The PDAS ask Gamal about the period after the 
parliamentary election. He replied that Egypt's unregistered 
voters were now excited about politics and enthusiastic to 
register to vote in future elections, when the registration 
period opens in late 2005. The PDAS asked if any opposition 
party would get the five percent of the parliamentary seats 
need to field a future presidential candidate. Gamal 
shrugged and replied that this would depend on the opposition 
parties' organization and discipline. Might the GOE revise 
Article 76 again, the PDAS asked, if an opposition party 
failed to get the required five percent? Gamal replied that 
talk of additional modification of Article 76 was premature: 
"the ink is not yet dry," he said. 

¶13. (C) He also argued that the special candidacy rules in 
2005, to encourage multiple presidential candidates, could 
not be extended in future elections. The somewhat less 
restrictive rules for 2005 had been necessary, he said, as an 
incentive to the parties to "get their acts together." In 
the long term, however, encouragement of fringe candidates 
who do not have significant parliamentary representation 
would be a recipe for "chaos." 

¶14. (C) The PDAS sought Gamal's views on rumors that the 
President plans to appoint a vice president. Gamal professed 
ignorance on the subject. Should the President appoint a VP, 
the PDAS asked. Gamal paused for a moment then said some 
people argue the President should name a Vice President, 
while others say that the new amendment to the Constitution 
makes a vice president unnecessary. Gamal said, "I listen to 
both arguments." 

-------------- 
A Man in Full? 
-------------- 

¶15. (C) At Gamal's invitation, the PDAS and DAS later 
attended the gala reception on September 29 hosted by the NDP 
for the diplomatic corps on the occasion of the party's 
annual conference. Members of the diplomatic corps, 
including the Iranian Ambassador, gathered around Gamal vying 
for his attention and the opportunity to shake his hand. 
Party old-guard figures Kemal al-Shazli and Safwat Sherif 
stood together off to the side while Gamal was clearly the 
center of the show. Minister of Tourism, Ahmed Maghrabi, 
told the PDAS that members of the new guard received loud and 
prolonged applause whenever they took the podium at the party 
congress. The reception for old guard figures, by contrast, 
was muted and polite. Judging from this, Maghrabi said, "I 
don't think the old guard will be with us much longer." 

¶16. (U) PDAS Cheney cleared this message. 


RICCIARDONE

Source: 05Cairo7782

الترجمة العربية: بقلم  نوارة نجم

Mubarak: "Gamal is a perfectionist"

S E C R E T CAIRO 000057 

SIPDIS 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, AND INR/B 
NSC FOR PASCUAL 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/14/2018 
TAGS: PINR PGOV PREL EG
SUBJECT: MUBARAK DISCUSSES BACK SURGERY, GAMAL AS 
PERFECTIONIST 

Classified By: ECPO Minister-Counselor William R. Stewart 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (S/NF) During his January 6 meeting with the Ambassador 
and visiting Congressman Steven Israel (D-NY), President 
Mubarak described his June 2004 back surgery in Germany to 
repair a slipped disc (he stressed it was not a herniated 
disc). Mubarak said that the opening made in his back was 
"very small," that he was in surgery for one-and-a-half 
hours, and that after the operation, he had felt no pain. 
"The next day, I was able to walk." He explained that during 
the time he was sedated, the Prime Minister (Atef Obeid) was 
"in charge." He added that when in Cairo, he undertakes a 
daily exercise regime in the afternoons, but when he goes to 
Sharm, "I just relax -- no exercise." 

¶2. (S/NF) Throughout the meeting, Mubarak was expansive and 
in fine humor. He rose easily from his seat several times to 
point out activity on the golf course and to be photographed 
with his visitors. He engaged the visitors extensively on 
the topic of food, stressing that his favorite fare is 
Egyptian popular breakfast dishes, such as tamiya (felafel) 
and foul (beans). He ordered up a huge tray of freshly made 
tamiya sandwiches for lunch, and lustily consumed several. 

¶3. (S/NF) Mubarak also offered insights into the character of 
his younger son, Gamal, whom he described as a perfectionist 
from childhood. "As a schoolboy, if I gave him a notebook 
with one line that was not straight, he would throw a fit and 
demand a new one," Mubarak laughed. Furthermore, Gamal is 
"idealistic" and "punctual." Mubarak added, "If he (Gamal) 
says, 'meet me for lunch at 2:00,' he means 2:00. Set your 
watch by it." 

¶4. (S/NF) During the two-and-a-half hour long meeting at his 
golf course retreat in Sharm El-Sheikh, mostly outdoors on a 
breezy veranda, Mubarak on several occasions seemed to have 
more than his usual difficulty in hearing. Nonetheless, he 
initiated several phone calls. He also displayed one 
apparent lapse in memory in telling Congressman Israel that 
Gamal is forty-one years old; he is in fact forty-four (born 
December 27, 1963, according to leadership profile 20320807). 

Ricciardone

Source: 08Cairo57

الترجمة العربية: بقلم نوارة نجم

About the Presidential Succession Issue

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002010 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NSC STAFF FOR SINGH 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: ACTIONS LOUDER THAN WORDS - GAMAL MUBARAK 
AND THE PRESIDENCY 

Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 

------- 
Summary 
------- 

¶1. (C) The public profile of Gamal Mubarak, presidential son 
and rising star in the ruling party, has increased in recent 
months. His appearance in late March on an evening talk show 
and a highly publicized visit to a Cairo slum have fueled 
speculation that an effort to succeed his father is moving 
full speed ahead. The possibility that Gamal might succeed 
his father remains deeply unpopular on the street - a 
sentiment often echoed by commentators in the independent and 
opposition press. Gamal has denied that he harbors 
presidential ambitions, but many believe his actions speak 
louder than his words. The intra-family politics of a Gamal 
succession bid are unclear. Conventional wisdom holds that 
Suzanne Mubarak is her younger son's most ardent booster. 
Gamal's chances are improved by the fact that there are no 
other obvious contenders for the presidency waiting in the 
wings. End summary. 

------------- 
Burning Issue 
------------- 

¶2. (C) The issue of presidential succession is the hottest 
single issue on Egypt's domestic political scene. Unlike his 
predecessors, President Mubarak has never named a Vice 
President. Mubarak, who began his fifth six year term in 
September 2005, will turn 78 in May. Though he is vigorous 
and healthy, there is general recognition that the actuarial 
tables will catch up with Mubarak sooner or later. 
Speculation that Mubarak was grooming his son Gamal to 
succeed him increased markedly in 2002, when the younger 
Mubarak assumed a prominent leadership post in the ruling 
National Democratic Party (NDP), just two years after Bashar 
al-Asad succeeded his father in Syria. 

------------- 
Stage Setting 
------------- 

¶3. (C) Both Gamal and his father have repeatedly denied that 
there is any plan for a "succession scenario." More 
important than such words, many Egyptians tell us, are the 
actions of Gamal, his father, and others, which appear to be 
setting the stage for the young Mubarak's rise to power. In 
the summer of 2004 and again at the end of 2005, the 
President shuffled his cabinet, replacing "old guard" figures 
with younger, ambitious technocrats, most with direct or 
indirect links to Gamal. In early 2006, a shake-up in the 
ruling NDP promoted Gamal to the post of Assistant 
Secretary-General (co-equal with Zakaria Azmy, the 

SIPDIS 
President's de-facto Chief of Staff, and old-guard cabinet 
veteran Mufeed Shehab). The party shuffle also brought a 
number of other Gamal allies into key party leadership 
positions, replacing a number of old-guard rival kingmakers, 
including the notorious machine politician Kamal al-Shazly. 


------------- 
Settling Down 
------------- 

¶4. (C) Gamal's February engagement to the 24 year old 
socialite Khadiga el-Gammal is widely viewed as another step 
on the path to the presidency. In a society where men 
typically marry before their 30th birthday, Gamal's 
bachelorhood has extended into his 40's. Thus Gamal's 
engagement, cynics tell us, was engineered to broaden his 
appeal. 

--------------------------- 
"Not for Any Other Purpose" 
--------------------------- 

¶5. (C) On March 28, Gamal paid a visit, camera crews in tow, 
to the slums of Agouza al-Qadima in Giza, just west of 
Central Cairo. Gamal was there, with Housing Minister (and 
ally) Ahmed al-Maghraby, to cut the ribbon on new low income 
housing units prepared by his Future Generation Foundation, a 
development group he founded in 1999, aimed at addressing the 
needs of poor youth. Most political observers regard the 
foundation as a vehicle primarly intended for Gamal's public 
entree onto the political stage. "We came to help and serve 
only - not for any other purpose," Gamal told accompanying 
journalists in Agouza. 

¶6. (C) Later that evening, Gamal made a rare appearance on a 
talk show on State Channel 1, promoted all day in advance of 
the broadcast and re-aired on March 29. Gamal focused his 
remarks on his work to rejuvenate the NDP and promote reform 
and "new thinking." He denied that he was out of touch with 
the public, asserting that "one enjoys...going down into the 
street and listening to the people." He also asserted that 
he regularly visits the provinces, but usually keeps a low 
profile lest people ascribe ulterior motives. We have 
noticed an uptick of recent Gamal forays outside of Cairo. 
He stood in for his father, grounded in Cairo by a dust 
storm, at the ribbon cutting for an international air show in 
Sharm el Sheikh. Given all the attention, he could have 
easily been mistaken as the head of state himself. 

-------------- 
Stone Throwers 
-------------- 

¶7. (C) On his alleged presidential ambitions, Gamal told 
Egyptian talk show viewers on March 28 that he had "made 
clear as daylight" that he did not intend to seek the 
presidency and was instead focused on his current efforts to 
promote reform and serve society. These denials have been 
generally disregarded. "He is repackaging himself - if he is 
not interested, why is he going to all this trouble?" 
prominent liberal dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim recently mused 
to a western journalist. Former Nasser advisor and 
influential writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal has made 
opposition to Gamal's succession a staple of his regular 
newspaper columns in the independent press. The notion that 
Gamal might succeed his father, Heikal has written, is an 
affront to Egypt's republican principles. 

¶8. (C) Abdel Halim Qandil, editor of the Nasserist weekly 
Al-Araby (and a co-founder of the Kifaya protest movement), 
was a pioneer of the anti-Gamal movement, authoring in 2003 a 
series of scathing editorials against the alleged plot to 
install Gamal and underlining the public's "universal 
rejection" of the notion. These editorials, many believe, 
were linked to Qandil's brief 2004 abduction and beating by 
still unidentified thugs, who left him bruised and naked on 
the Suez desert highway. 

¶9. (C) Very publicly resigning from the NDP in early March, 
leading liberal thinker Osama el-Ghazaly Harb told us of his 
disillusionment with the party's reform process, which he 
came to believe was merely a vehicle for Gamal to promote his 
political career. Imprisoned opposition politician Ayman 
Nour and his supporters have repeatedly insisted to us that 
it was his threat to Gamal that led to his political 
destruction. Like Gamal, Nour is 42 years old. 

¶10. (C) An article that appeared March 23 in the maverick 
independent paper Al-Dustour attacked Gamal from a new angle. 
With dubious sourcing, the paper alleged that the Egyptian 
brokerage and financial analysis firm EFG-Hermes had 
manipulated the early March drop of the Cairo-Alexandria 
Stock Exchange to the advantage of its partners and clients 
and at the expense of small investors, adding that Gamal 
Mubarak is on the firm's board. The article clearly got 
Gamal's attention: He acknowledged in his talk show 
appearance that he sat on EFG's board, but insisted that his 
work focused on subsidiary companies not traded on the stock 
market. 

------------- 
An Open Field 
------------- 

¶11. (C) Despite the sniping of many Egyptian opinion-leaders, 
and a more general public hostility (echoed by many of our 
contacts) to Gamal's possible presidential succession, there 
are few other obvious contenders for the post. The post of 
Vice President has remained vacant, despite earlier 
speculation that Mubarak might fill it after the 2005 
elections were behind him. Of the 10 candidates who 
contested Mubarak's presidency last fall, Ayman Nour, who 
placed second, lost his parliamentary seat under very 
controversial circumstances and was subsequently convicted of 
forgery and sentenced to a seven year jail term. The 
third-place finisher, Wafd Party candidate No'man Gomaa, was 
arrested for attempted murder and other charges on April 1 
(septel). The other eight candidates, marginal figures to 
begin with, have faded back into nearly total obscurity. 

¶12. (C) There are currently almost no other Egyptian 
personalities with the national stature and political capital 
needed to seriously contend for the presidency. One 
exception could be Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman, who 
wields enormous influence over national security policy and 
is known to have the full confidence of Mubarak. Soliman is 
often cited as a potential appointee to the long-vacant Vice 
Presidential post and his profile has grown with his 
well-publicized mediation visits to Israel and the 
Palestinian territories. 

¶13. (C) Another possible exception could be Arab League 
Secretary-General Amr Moussa, who has a high public profile 

SIPDIS 
and generally receives favorable coverage across the spectrum 
of Egyptian media outlets. Consequently, he enjoys 
considerable street crediblity as a champion of Arab causes. 
However, Moussa has never expressed or even hinted at any 
presidential ambitions and has no Egyptian institutional 
platform from which to spring. Moussa's assumption of 
another five year term as Arab League SYG could be 
alternately interpreted as keeping him "otherwise occupied" 
or "still in the game," with respect to future political 
positions, but he has never offered any hint that he intends 
to wade into Egypt's domestic political scene. 

----------------- 
All in the Family 
----------------- 

¶14. (C) The intra-family politics of a Gamal succession bid 
are unclear. Elder son Alaa', well-known to have extensive 
business interests (many of which are privately criticized as 
corrupt and exploitative) keeps a low public profile and has 
never shown any inclination to wade into the political arena. 
(A rare sighting of Alaa' on national TV took place during 
the final game of the Africa Cup championship in late 
February, when he was photographed in the stadium's VIP 
section with Gamal, cheering on Egypt to its 2-1 victory over 
Ivory Coast.) 

¶15. (C) The President has been careful not to indicate any 
overt support for Gamal, is rarely photographed with him, and 
has on several occasions angrily denied to the media that 
there is any plan for his younger son to succeed him. While 
some have speculated that the President is ambivalent about 
Gamal's political future, he has not stood in the way of the 
rise of his son and his allies through the ranks of the 
ruling NDP, or obstructed his increased public profile. 
Moreover, the President has twice in the past two years 
shuffled his cabinet and replaced "old guard" elements with 
younger technocrats linked to Gamal. While there is little 
public evidence, commonly accepted wisdom in Cairo is that 
First Lady Suzanne Mubarak is Gamal's most ardent political 
patron. Unlike the President, the First Lady is often 
photographed at public events with Gamal, frequently in 
connection with social issues. Her power and influence, many 
argue, are keys to Gamal's viability. Sources tell us that 
she has kept Mubarak pere from naming a Vice President. 

--------------------- 
Legal Framework Wired 
--------------------- 

¶16. (C) The legal/electoral stage, rearranged in 2005 with 
the amendment of Article 76 of the constitution, currently 
guarantees that the ruling NDP, increasingly dominated by 
Gamal and his allies, will retain their lock on the 
presidency. Of all 20 of Egypt's legally recognized parties, 
only the NDP currently meets the conditions as defined in the 
amendment to field a presidential candidate. (The rules set 
forth in the amendment state that only parties holding five 
percent or more of the seats in each of the People's Assembly 
and the Shura Council. The bar is set higher for 
independents, who must obtain endorsements from 65 PA 
members, 25 Shura Council members, and 10 local council 
members from each of at least 14 of the 26 provinces.) While 
voters will have opportunities to change the current makeup 
of the Shura Council in 2007 and 2009, and the People's 
Assembly in 2010, should a presidential transition become 
necessary sooner, there would be no legal or procedural 
hurdles for any NDP candidate to the presidency. 

--------------------------- 
A Military Stumbling Block? 
--------------------------- 

¶17. (C) A key stumbling block for any effort to bring Gamal 
Mubarak to the presidency could be the military. Each of 
Egypt's three presidents since the republic was established 
in 1952 were drawn from the military's officer corps, and the 
military has historically been the ultimate guarantor of the 
president's rule. Gamal Mubarak did not serve as a military 
officer (and it is not clear whether he ever completed, even 
"on paper," his national military service) and unlike his 
father, can not take the military's support for granted. 
This factor is often cited by our contacts, who believe that 
Soliman, the intelligence chief with a military background, 
would have to figure in any succession scenario for Gamal, if 
only as a transitional figure. Another theory is that some 
other military officer could emerge from obscurity as a 
presidential contender. (Defense Minister Tantawi is 
acknowledged to be frail and without any political ambition.) 


------- 
Comment 
------- 

¶18. (C) Gamal Mubarak's rise in the ruling NDP, his attempts 
to position himself as a "friend of the people," and as the 
national champion of reform and "new thinking," are all 
compelling evidence that his political ambitions are real - 
denials notwithstanding. Despite palpable public hostility 
to his succession, and potential stumbling blocks, the way 
forward for Gamal currently appears open. Gamal and his 
ambitious allies, such as MP and NDP figure Ahmed Ezz and 
economic reform ministers such as Rachid Rachid and Youssef 
Boutrous Ghali, are apparently banking that structural 
improvements to the economy will deliver tangible benefits to 
the masses, and build a support base that extends beyond 
affluent business circles. 

RICCIARDONE

Source: 06Cairo2010

الترجمة العربية: بقلم نوارة نجم

Egypt continues to provide critical Suez Canal and overflight access for U.S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002543 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

CENTCOM FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS FROM AMBASSADOR SCOBEY 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL PARM MASS MOPS EG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL PETRAEUS' VISIT TO EGYPT 

REF: A. CAIRO 2175 
¶B. CAIRO 2141 

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey per 1.4 (b) and (d). 

¶1. (S/NF) Summary and Introduction: General Petraeus, 
welcome to Egypt. Your visit will be, I hope, the first in a 
regular process of dialogue and consultation with Egyptian 
leaders who view the U.S.-Egyptian security partnership as 
the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. This visit 
provides an opportunity for you to assess the state of our 
military partnership and to identify new opportunities. To 
date, the U.S. investment in the Egyptian Armed Forces (over 
$36 billion since 1980) through the Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) program has supported peace between Egypt and 
Israel and assured Egyptian support for extending peace to 
the rest of the Arab world. In addition, the Egyptian 
military has the potential to become interoperable with U.S. 
forces * capable of fighting side by side as they did in the 
1991 First Gulf War - and continues to provide critical Suez 
Canal and overflight access for U.S. military operations and 
to provide peacekeepers to regional and international 
conflict zones. 

¶2. (S/NF) The United States has sought to interest the 
Egyptian military into expanding their mission in ways that 
reflect new regional and transnational security threats, such 
as piracy, border security, and counterterrorism. Egypt,s 
aging leadership, however, has resisted our efforts and 
remains satisfied with continuing to do what they have done 
for years: train for force-on-force warfare with a premium 
on ground forces and armor. 

¶3. (S/NF) We have requested meetings with President Mubarak, 
Defense Minister Field Marshal Tantawi, EGIS Chief General 
Soliman, and Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit. The overall 
U.S.-Egyptian relationship has suffered in the past few 
years. The Egyptians have lost confidence in U.S. regional 
leadership. They believe that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was 
an unmitigated disaster that has unleashed Iranian regional 
ambitions and that the U.S. waited far too long to engage in 
Arab-Israeli peacemaking efforts. In addition, U.S. and 
Egyptian differences over the pace and direction of political 
reform have drained the warmth from the relationship on both 
sides. We believe President Mubarak would be interested in 
an early visit to Washington to consult with President Obama, 
in large part to try to begin repairing the relationship. 
End Summary. 

------------------------------------------- 
Mil-Mil Cooperation: In Need of Renovation 
------------------------------------------- 

¶4. (S/NF) Mubarak and military leaders view the FMF program 
as the cornerstone of our security relationship and believe 
the $1.3 billion annual grant should be viewed as 
"untouchable compensation" for making peace with Israel. They 
complain that the parity between U.S. assistance to Israel 
and to Egypt has been destroyed as U.S. security assistance 
to Israel has climbed and theirs has remained fixed. We have 
come to take the U.S.-Egyptian security partnership for 
granted, but we should not underestimate its value to us and 
the region. Our partnership guarantees there can be no 
resumption of overt Arab-Israeli war and also provides 
valuable US military access to the Suez Canal and Egyptian 
airspace. We would not like to contemplate complications for 
U.S. regional interests should the U.S.-Egyptian bond be 
seriously weakened. Nevertheless, we recognize the 
backward-looking nature of Egypt,s military posture and 
believe that finding new, mutually agreed objectives could 
assure the continuation of our strategic ties with Egypt into 
the future. 

¶5. (S/NF) Seventy-seven year old Field Marshall Tantawi, in 
office since 1991, has resisted any change to usage of FMF 
funding and has been the chief impediment to transforming the 
military,s mission to meet emerging security threats. 
During his tenure, the tactical and operational readiness of 
the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) has decayed. But he retains 
Mubarak's support, and could easily remain in place for years 
to come. Tantawi will likely express his opposition to 
Congress conditioning military and economic assistance and 
will seek support in convincing Congress of Egypt's strategic 
importance. He will also make a case for the release of 
certain military systems such as the TOW IIB and F-15 
fighter aircraft. 

CAIRO 00002543 002 OF 003 



¶6. (S/NF) You should assure Mubarak and Tantawi that Egypt 
remains a key U.S. ally, but that we would like to find new 
areas of cooperation that build on existing relationships but 
that look to meeting new threats. Such a development would 
help us defend the Egyptian FMF program by demonstrating its 
ongoing value. 

¶7. (S/NF) Threats to this partnership exist. Although all 
previous Administrations and Congresses since Camp David have 
reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to a strategic U.S.-Egyptian 
relationship, the events of the last few years have made a 
few cracks in the foundations. Congressional concern about 
Egypt,s poor human rights and democracy record prompted the 
imposition in 2008 of conditions upon Egypt,s assistance 
program. Although the Secretary of State was given the right 
to waive the conditionality, the Egyptians view 
conditionality as "unacceptable." We are currently dealing 
with the conditionality issue for FY2009. 

¶8. (S/NF) The potential for Congressional action that could 
affect Egyptian FMF/ESF funding, creates even greater reason 
for Egypt to begin to orient more of its military 
capabilities toward unconventional threats. The more 
Egyptian military cooperation can be viewed as backstopping 
U.S. military requirements in the region, the easier it is to 
defend the Egyptian assistance program on the Hill. Over the 
last year, we have engaged MOD leaders on developing shared 
objectives to address current threats, including border 
security, counter terrorism, civil defense, and 
peace-keeping. Our efforts thus far have met with limited 
success. After initially strong resistance, MOD supported 
the first phase of a $23 million FMF-funded counter-smuggling 
system soon to be installed on the Gaza-Egyptian border (ref 
A). You should encourage Tantawi to immediately approve the 
follow-on stages and stress the importance of using the 
knowledge gained from the seismic-acoustic equipment to 
destroy tunnels and break up arms smuggling rings. 

¶9. (S/NF) One way to demonstrate Egypt's continued strategic 
importance is through shifting more FMF funding to address 
asymmetric threats like terrorism and improving border 
security along its long and porous borders. You should also 
stress with GOE interlocutors that our mil-mil relationship 
is much greater than the yearly flow of military assistance. 
Egypt could play a much more active 
and influential role in regional security issues, including 
supporting and training the Iraqi military, deploying more 
peace keeping troops to Sudan, joining neighbors in combating 
piracy, and stemming the flow of illegal migration. Another 
such concrete display of a more forward looking security 
strategy would be to support CENTCOM's efforts to re-invent 
BRIGHT STAR. Tantawi will lament the loss of large-scale 
BRIGHT STAR. You should stress that BRIGHT STAR continues to 
be an important strategic 
statement for the U.S. and its regional allies, and solicit 
his input for ways to make BRIGHT STAR more relevant. 

---------------- 
Regional Efforts 
---------------- 

¶10. (S/NF) While the military remains inwardly focused, 
Mubarak and key Egyptian officials remain engaged on a number 
of regional issues. On Iraq, although President Mubarak 
remains deeply suspicious that Nuri Al Maliki answers to 
Tehran, other GOE officials have expressed increasing 
confidence that Iraq has turned a corner and may avoid civil 
war. Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit recently completed a 
successful trip to Baghdad in October (ref B) and is moving 
forward to reopen the Embassy in Baghdad. On the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, GOE efforts to facilitate 
intra-Palestinian reconciliation under the auspices of EGIS 
Chief General Soliman foundered in November due, in their 
view, to Iranian-Syrian meddling. On Iran, Egypt is concerned 
by rising Iranian influence in the region and has supported 
UN sanctions, but does not have a comprehensive strategy to 
counter Iran's regional momentum. The 
Egyptians have worked with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states 
to support Lebanese political and territorial sovereignty. 

¶11. (S/NF) Egypt is a steadfast ally in the GWOT, and we 
maintain close cooperation on a broad range of 
counter-terrorism and law enforcement issues. We have a 
long-standing and productive relationship with EGIS and SSIS, 
the two Egyptian agencies that cover internal and regional 

CAIRO 00002543 003 OF 003 


terrorism issues. Through the Department of State's 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, we are working with SSIS 
to establish an anti-terror investigative unit, and also are 
in the beginning stages of a USG-funded community policing 
program that will include needed human rights training. 

------------------------------- 
Internal Politics and Economics 
------------------------------- 

¶12. (C) Our fundamental political reform goal in Egypt 
remains democratic transformation, including the expansion of 
political freedom and pluralism, respect for human rights, 
and a stable and legitimate transition to the post-Mubarak 
era. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, 
are being suffocated, and Mubarak remains skeptical of our 
role in democracy promotion, lecturing us that any efforts to 
open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood 
(which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's parliament). 
Mubarak now makes scant public pretense of advancing a vision 
for democratic change. An ongoing challenge remains balancing 
our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts. 

¶13. (S/NF) Mubarak, who is now 80, is in solid health, 
notwithstanding a hearing deficit in his left ear. The next 
presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and if Mubarak 
is still alive it is likely he will run again, and, 
inevitably, win. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no 
one in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually 
succeed Mubarak, nor how the succession will happen. Mubarak 
himself seems to be trusting to God and the inertia of the 
military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly 
transition. The most likely contenders for next president 
are presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is 
ever-increasing at the ruling party), EGIS chief Omar 
Soliman, dark horse Arab League Secretary-General Amre 
Moussa, another old-guard regime insider, or an as-yet 
unknown military officer. 

¶14. (C) Economic reform has been a success story, although 
Egypt still suffers from widespread and so far irremediable 
poverty affecting upwards of 35-40% of the population. 
Reforms in trade and tax policy, financial reform, 
privatization and increased transparency have led to 7% 
economic growth in the last fiscal year. Foreign investment 
increased from around $3 billion in 2005 to $11 
billion in the last year, mostly in the petroleum sector. 
Despite this success, significant problems remain, including 
20% inflation, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and 
endemic corruption. The effects of the global financial 
crisis on Egypt may not be as severe as elsewhere, as 
Egyptian banks operate very conservatively and have been 
spared involvement in risky financial products. The informal 
economy also provides a certain degree of resiliency to the 
economic picture. Nevertheless, as the economic crisis 
worsens, Egypt remains vulnerable as exports, Suez canal 
revenues, tourism, and remittances will reflect global 
trends. 

¶15. (S/NF) U.S. economic assistance will drop from $415 
million in FY 2008 to $200 million annually for the next five 
years starting in FY 2009. The Egyptians are not pleased 
with the cut and have suggested several ways of using the 
assistance that would be difficult to get through Congress, 
such as debt relief. We would like to focus assistance on 
health care and education reform along with poverty 
alleviation. Negotiations are ongoing over use of future 
assistance funds. 
SCOBEY

Source: 08Cairo2543